Since World War II, American scientists have played significant roles in the formulation of United States policy regarding the development and deployment of nuclear and other technologically complex weapons. For over a decade, scientists have sought to influence in various ways the nuclear policies of a government sincerely committed to the achievement of some measure of arms control or disarmament. A decade, however, has proved to be too short a period for the emergence of comfortable working relationships between the government and the scientific community.
A recent volume-Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians by Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein*-explores the interrelationships between scientists and non-scientists in policy-formation and in international negotiation. It is a case study of the events leading up to the 1963 test ban agreement, the only major arms control pact signed to date. A competently researched if somewhat over-documented' volume, it reveals the influence of technical analyses over policy during the seven years of Soviet-American negotiations. The record demonstrates that the United States consistently turned to "science" to avoid making or revealing difficult policy decisions. In fact, scientists were injected into the negotiations because of a political gambit, before the United States committed itself to a test ban at all. Secretary Dulles needed to counter what he considered the propaganda victory scored by the Soviet Union 1. The book is laden with references to public records of the Geneva negotiations, and relates the course of the talks on an almost day-by-day basis. A good deal of this could have been summarized, and the reader referred to two U.S. Government publications which do an entirely adequate job of setting forth the successive changes in the bargaining positions of the various nations. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GENEVA in March, 1958 , when at the end of a prolonged series of tests, and just before an American series was scheduled to begin, it announced that it would unilaterally cease testing if other nations did likewise. Dulles himself drafted a letter which President Eisenhower sent to Chairman Khrushchev, proposing that technical experts from both sides meet to discuss control measures for a test ban; this was designed to seem like a new initiative without committing the United States to a substantive diplomatic position. Dulles thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union would agree to the proposal; it was "a limited risk which he was willing to accept." '2 In fact, the Russians did agree, and the scientists met. At the Conference of Experts it became clear first, that the difficult question in the years to come would be that of the detection of underground testing, and second, that no feasible inspection system could guarantee the detection of every test. Some element of risk would remain. Tests of weapons of less than a certain threshold of explosive power might remain hidden; the size of the threshold would depend on the extent of the control network. In retrospect it became easy to separate the problem into a technical component (what size of test will this system detect, with what probability) and a political one (how much risk is this nation willing to accept, given the extrinsic goals of reversing the arms race, ending fallout, etc.). These components remained muddled for a long time. The United States wished to put off decisions about acceptable risk as long as possible, and that desire was compounded in this case because any decision would have to be made on the basis of countless uncertainties (e.g., the weapons that might be developed of which no one had any inkling, the possibility that a nation could devise a method of clandestine testing that would evade the control system altogether, and the fact that all of the discussions of detection had been conducted on the basis of data from a single underground test). And the American scientists were aware that a joint technical report which merely described a given control system would have important political repercussions.
Before the Conference of Experts, scientists urged Washington to decide on an acceptable threshold, but "this issue was dropped into the lap of the American delegation in Geneva." ' At the Conference the Russians recommended one control system (implicitly tied to a particular threshold) and the Americans another. The British suggested a third, compromise system. The scientist who chaired the American dele-gation "tried desperately to obtain a judgment from Washington as to whether or not the [British] control system... would present an acceptable risk to the United States, but he could not obtain this assurance." 4 Nevertheless, the scientists of all three nations recommended to their governments a single system similar to that suggested by the British.
After the Experts' Conference adjourned, a "political" Conference was convened. During its first recess, the United States discovered new scientific data demonstrating that the scientists had been insufficiently cautious in extrapolating detection data from the results of one explosion. The "new data" was rushed to the Conference in raw form; no attempt was made to propose specific modifications in the recommended control system. Washington continued to think of the problem as a purely technical one. There had never been reached a decision on threshold which could serve as the basis for demanding an upgrading in the control system. The Soviets, many neutrals, and many Americans as well saw the presentation of the new data, without a counter-proposal, as an obvious attempt to torpedo the Experts' recommendations without providing any alternative basis for discussions.
As the American scientists became more aware than ever of their role as policy-makers-by-default, the absence of political instructions had another effect. The Americans knew that, in general, the U.S. could not accept a treaty based largely on "trust," although to some extent, because of the uncertainties, any treaty would have to contain some element of trust. Given no word about acceptable risk, the scientists advising the political conference pushed for "minimum" risk, whatever that was. This led to ridiculous proposals, requiring more and more detection equipment. For instance, the American scientists argued "the need for a system of satellites in orbit around the sun, so that there would be no blind spots behind the sun or the moon" in which the Russians could test. 5 Of course such a secret operation was possible, and the scientists had no basis by which to discount it as improbable.
Unlike its predecessor, the Kennedy Administration, which actively sought a test ban, was able to distinguish between the political and the technical aspects of the detection problem, but it relied on the wealth of technical data to obscure its political decisions. It perpetuated the myth that U.S. policy was dictated by the state of the art of seismology; changes in policy were rationalized in terms of new scientific discoveries. A strong reason for the administration's willingness to make concessions in late 1962 and early 1963 was its belief in the imperative of The abandonment of a threshold (below which tests would be allowed) was occasioned by the fact that it would be too difficult to police (i.e., to tell precisely what the yield was in borderline cases), plus a belief that the U.S.S.R. would not agree to a treaty which allowed any testing to continue. The choice of the number eight and then seven as the number of annual on-site inspections demanded was a result not of any scientific formula, but was determined by a hope that the U.S.S.R. would compromise at five, and a suspicion that the Senate would certainly refuse to ratify a treaty allowing fewer than five inspections. The dropping of the demand for internationally supervised control posts in the U.S.S.R. was also a measure designed to facilitate agreement, since Soviet objections and fears of espionage had made this an extremely difficult issue in the past.
These lines of argument were not the ones offered to Congress or to the public to justify the U.S. position in early 1963. Treaty ratification would be more likely if the government could rely on its scientists rather than its willingness to trust the Russians not to spend half of their budget hiding nuclear tests. Three devices were used to imply that reductions in American demands were justified by the cold data.
The first was continued statements that the system suggested by the U.S. guaranteed detection: "We have suggested that we would not accept a test ban which did not give us every assurance that we could detect a series of tests underground." 0 The second was the constant refrain that the new revisions in U.S. policy had been made only after a careful review of the data: "There have been numerous reassessments of the technical problems involved in detecting underground nuclear explosions .... These reassessments have.., produced changes in the U.S. position." 7 The third was the provision of generally optimistic technical testimony. However, specific lines of logic were not drawn between the data that was released and the policy advocated. From the point of view of technical reasoning, there remained many gaps.
For instance, the administration still did not discuss the acceptable threshold below which it thought weapons development would not be significant. ( Perhaps the most fascinating topic which the authors discuss-unfortunately, they only touch upon it-is the question of which scientists have a role in the formation of policy. As the authors point out, a scientific consensus is rare. In 1958, for example, the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament asked thirty-five seismologists, geophysicists, and geologists to discuss the issues of detection and identification.
The report contained a mass of contradictory information. Some of the scientists replied unambiguously that underground explosions could be detected, others thought that some such explosions could, while still others held that it was impossible to make any general statement on the basis of existing knowledge. There was no agreement concerning the size of signals produced by explosions of various yields. 8 Obviously, it is important that the President and his political advisors be exposed to the widest possible variety of scientific viewpoints, even if this puts them into the difficult position of having to be sufficiently informed on technical matters that it is possible to make an informed guess about which scientist is right. Whether our current machinery suffices to provide this maximum exposure is doubtful. On technical matters relating to test ban policy, the President was advised by his Scientific Advisor, plus, over time, a series of five specially chosen ad hoc committees of scientists. In addition, two sets of scientists composed the American delegations to the Conference of Experts and Technical Working Group II, which dealt with underground testing. This might seem to bring the policy-makers into contact with a great 8. Pp. 60-61. many scientists, and to enable new points of view to emerge. It is only natural, however, when convening a panel of experts from an unfamiliar field, to choose those who have proved their expertise by prior work of a similar nature. Comparison of the authors' footnote listings of scientific advisors reveals that when the new Kennedy Administration convened scientists to take a fresh look at the technical aspects of the negotiations, eleven of the thirteen chosen scientists had been members of at least one of the five previous panels and delegations. The authors believe that the President's Scientific Advisory Committee can adequately present divergent viewpoints if it develops adequate techniques for transmitting them to the White House. 0 Since the Committee will contain, at any one time, a maximum of three or four specialists in a particular field, and perhaps fewer in as specialized a field as seismology or geophysics, the authors' conclusion can be regarded as correct only if the Committee also works out methods of actively seeking out points of view which are at odds with those of its resident experts within the particular area at issue.
A problem related to who gives advice is who performs the research, at the very lowest and most basic level. Nearly all of the American research on detection of underground tests-perhaps all that was taken seriously-was performed under the auspices of project Vela Uniform. This detection program was modeled on the armament research program: the Defense Department was given $50 million annually to contract out to individuals and corporations to perform specified research tasks. Thus the Defense Department chose the scientists who might make discoveries significant for disarmament, guided their work, and made the crucial decisions as to which scientists' work merited further research or presentation to policy makers. As a consequence, " [a] n overwhelming number of the scientists who have been involved in the formulation of American security policy [from the points of view both of arming and of disarming] thus far have been employed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense," 10 which presents a certain danger because, as the authors understate it, "the views of most individuals are affected more or less strongly by the milieu in which they work."'"
The dangers inherent in Defense Department bureaucratization and monopolization of disarmament research are best illustrated by two case studies of scientists who tried to influence American test ban policy, 9. P. 483. 10. P. 484. 11. P. 485. and failed so badly that they are not even mentioned in the volume under review.
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THE CASE OF L. DON LEET Professor L. Don Leet, a scientist not employed by the Vela research project, criticized both the organization of that project and the fact that American policy was being made more rigid than the state of the art of seismology, in his opinion, required. Leet's motives were not political. A Republican all his life, Leet had never joined any political organizations and had no strong feelings one way or the other about accommodation with the Soviet Union. Even with regard to the test ban, he was politically naive; he vaguely realized that what he was doing had important political implications, but that had no effect whatsoever on his behavior. His struggle was a professional one; it did not have hidden political overtones.
L. Don Leet is one of the elder statesmen of American seismology. Born in 1901, he was the third recipient of the Ph.D. in seismology in the United States. In 1930, he was appointed to teach geology at Harvard (where he had received his graduate education), and to run the Harvard seismograph station, one of the first such stations in the country. He has taught seismology at Harvard for thirty-six years, and has written eight books and thirty-five articles. He happened to choose as his special field of study the measurement and interpretation of waves from underground dynamite explosions, and for this purpose, he designed the tri-directional Leet seismograph. When the first atomic bomb was exploded at Alamagordo, Leet was the man called to measure the seismic waves.
Leet was not aware that the U.S. was about to establish a seismic research program until the Vela program was actually set up in 1959. Considering his specialty in blast seismology, he was surprised that he had not been contacted earlier. In January, 1960, he submitted a contract proposal. He sought $154,300.00 to a) Develop and test equipment for continuous tape registration of earth waves on an open time scale .... b) Operate this equipment; investigate results of different types of analysis; develop criteria for distinguishing explosion waves from earthquake waves .... Attention would be directed first to the effect of these presentations on sharpness of first motion and other phases from both earth-12. Matters of fact concerning the two scientists which are not otherwise documented were discovered in a series of interviews with both scientists and corroborated to whatever degree possible by my investigations. It is of course possible that neither the scientists nor the author had perfect information about the events which transpired. quakes and blasts; also, to the distribution of energy among the various phases, and the ratio of energy in S to energy in P for earthquakes contrasted to explosions. 1 3 Leet felt that since he had been looking at records of both explosions and earthquakes for thirty years, he would be more likely to spot significant differences in them than practically anyone else. All through 1960 he waited for an answer from the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which administered Vela Uniform. Finally in December of that year, eleven months after he had submited his proposal, he received a six-sentence summary notice of rejection. 14 Leet was disappointed by his rejection, and curious about its cause. During 1961, he tried to find out why he had been turned down, but was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, he applied to the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey for a contract to equip the Harvard Seismograph Station with "standard instrumentation"; the agency was awarding such equipment to over a hundred stations as part of the Vela program. Harvard was again rejected; nearby Weston Observatory was chosen instead.
In January, 1962, Leet decided to re-open the question. He recalled having answered the questionnaire on test detection that had been sent to him in 1958 by Senator Humphrey, and now he called Humphrey's office. On January 31, an interview was arranged between Leet and Adrian Fisher, deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They discussed the test detection problem for an hour and a half. Finally Leet was asked, "if your theories prove correct, does it mean that we'll need more or less inspection in the Soviet Union?" Leet answered, "Less." He was told that the Agency would be in touch with him soon. But he was never called. 15 13. L. Don Leet, Proposal for Seismological Research Project, submitted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) on January 22, 1960. P waves and S waves are respectively the first and second types of waves which reach scismometers after a seismic event. L (long) waves are the third and last type to arrive after travelling through portions of the earth.
14. Your unsolicited proposal entitled "Proposal for Seismological Research Project," which was submitted to the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) on January 28, 1960, has recently been carefully reviewed jointly by this office and AFTAC. This proposal was considered for possible support as a research effort under the current VELA UNIFORM Program. Unfortunately, we do not find it possible to support the above proposal at the present time. Your interest in Project VELX, as
shown by your effort in preparing the subject proposal, is greatly appreciated. We regret that action on this proposal has been deferred during the past several months.
We will continue to consider the capabilities of your organization with regard to possible future participation in certain aspects of the nuclear test detection project. 
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In Feburary, Leet arranged an interview with Gerald Johnson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. Johnson introduced Leet to George Bing, who was in charge of Vela contracts. Leet asked why his proposal had been rejected. Before he received an answer, Johnson left the interview to meet some visitors from Europe. Bing said he would look up the record in his files.
In early March, Leet heard from Bing. Bing said:
After careful review of this proposal in conjunction with several other government agencies, ARPA decided that it was supporting as much development work in the field of seismic tape recording at that time as proper program balance and funding allocations would allow. 16 After two trips to Washington and two years of frustration trying to go through the official channels, Leet felt that this letter was the final blow. He felt that he had been insulted; his personal experience and reputation had been ignored, and his proposal had been interpreted solely as a request for money for instrumentation. Leet sent Bing a long and angry letter, complaining that his proposal had been misinterpreted as "just another tape recorder" and pointing out that even if that were what he'd proposed, the Vela project had awarded many such grants subsequent to receipt of his contract proposal.' 1 The reply was again a 16. Letter of March 5, 1962. 17. ... The implication that in effect my proposal was primarily one in instrumentation, just another tape recorder, misses the point by a wide margin. ... The central point was to get information from the ground in a form that I personally, from a background of 30 years with 50,000 earthquake records and studies of blast records from seismic prospecting types to the first atomic bomb (a combination Even before he received Bing's answer, Leet had come to the end of his patience. He used the forum of his undergraduate lecture course to tell the story of his dealings with Washington. Soon after, he was visited by a reporter from the student newspaper, the Crimson, and he agreed to grant an interview. Leet voiced all of the suspicions he had been holding back, and when the story broke, copies found their way into Washington and Moscow.
Aside from his personal frustration, Leet had two great complaints. First, he explained that seismologists fall into two broad groups---earthquake seismologists (who had spent years looking at waves from earthquakes, and, in a few very rare cases, large explosions), and "doodlebuggers," seismologists who had received practically all of their training in prospecting seismology. According to Leet, the five seismologists on the 14-man Berkner Panel (which recommended the establishment of Vela, and outlined the general directions that research would follow), were all essentially "doodlebuggers." In seeking to discriminate between bombs and earthquakes they concentrated on the direction of the ground motion of the first signal received when any earthquake station seismologist could have told them that that criterion was unworkable, due to the high noise level. But earthquake seismologists such as the Jesuits (who operate seismograph stations all over the country), representatives of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and independent seismologists with long experience (like himself) were "excluded." "Not using earthquake station seismologists on a project like this," he explains, "is like revising our measurement system without conweren't and aren't interested in the instrument manufacturing business by government subsidy or any other means.... I would like to avail myself of ARPA's expressed interest in suppl)ing some of the "new seismic data being generated by the Vela Uniform program." But to be in a position to specify the goals of an investigation in the detail you explained is necessary, Leet's other complaint was that of the $24 million awarded in Vela contracts up to August, 1961, two-thirds or $16 million went to members of the Berkner Panel, which had brought Vela into being, or to the companies represented by those members. Only two members of the Panel-Berkner and Hans Bethe-did not receive any contracts. The Crimson erroneously reported that the contract awards were issued by the Berkner Panel itself.
Two weeks after the Crimson article, Leet himself wrote an article in a Harvard magazine known as Cambridge 38. Leet elaborated on the charges he had made, and on his criticism of the whole system of contractual research.
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Then, on May 24, 1962, Leet spoke at a public meeting organized by Scientists for Social Responsibility in Science (of which Leet was not a member). At the meeting, Leet was asked if he felt that the seismic research project was a conspiracy or a boondoggle. He explained that he hoped he had not given the impression that there was a conscious conspiracy to make profits and suppress knowledge. In geology, he explained, as in any scientific field in America today, there are informal "clubs" of scientists and administrators. These men know each other professionally and in many cases, socially-they study together, write papers together, work together. The Berkner Panel, he felt, was one of these clubs. Once a few members have been appointed, they are 19. Gardner, supra note 15. 20. The Panel consisted of a nuclear physicist, five doodlebuggers, an oceanographer, four instrument designers, and two employees of instrument manufacturers . .. none of them had any experience in the parent science of earthquake seismology .... As far as I know, Press, Ewing, and Oliver are the only members of the panel who have done any significant work on earthquake records, and they started only a few years ago. They made a sort of special hobby out of surface, of L, waves, but unfortunately, it has turned out from the very few available records of nuclear tests that, at a distance, surface waves are apparently notable by their absence . . . There are a dozen working seismologists in this country who aren't known in the headlines, but . . . they've read records by the thousands ...
The way to solve problems like test detection is simple and has been known and used for generations. You make a thorough canvass of existing knowledge before you begin. You ask everybody who has been working in the area, "What have you done, what do you suggest?" You don't classify; you let what you are doing and thinking be known-if you are doing and thinking foolish things, people will tell you so ... secrecy is not at all necessary since the data on test detection is being accumulated for the express purpose of showing it to the Russians. Leet, Nuclear Test Detection, Cambridge 38, April, 1962, pp. 9-10. 1350 [V/ol. 75:13t40 likely to be asked, "Who else would be a good choice?", and they are likely to name the colleagues whom they know best, their contemporaries. In this case, the younger generation was called, and the men who had started the field thirty years before were excluded, more by oversight than by malice. When it came to deciding who could best use the money, the names of the members of the Berkner Panel were the ones that were familiar to the contract officers, and they were invited to submit proposals.
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Whether he had meant it or not, Leet's articles certainly had suggested a conspiracy. And they attracted publicity. The Boston Traveler ran a front-page picture story on Leet. The New Republic discussed his case. Left-wing periodicals such as the National Guardian gave him coverage. Even Isvestia printed a badly distorted version of Leet's charges.
As it turned out, not all of Leet's criticisms had been adequately researched or judiciously phrased. It is not clear whether or not he had thought, in March, that the Berkner Panel awarded the contracts; he claims the undergraduate newspaper misquoted him, but at one point he stated that he "stood behind" the story. He had stated, in both articles, that the Berkner Panel "insisted that the U.S. raise its demands"; he was wrong, in that the Panel never suggested policy, but only tried to describe the state of the art and the need for research. Furthermore, it was an exaggeration to refer to Drs. Press, Ewing, Oliver, Romney and Benioff as "doodle-buggers." Press and Ewing, for example, directed seismology at Cal. Tech. and Columbia, though they had not been in the field anywhere near the time Leet had.
Leet was criticized for his exaggerations by Dr. Norman Haskell, a branch chief at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, which was working on a large Vela contract. Haskell challenged Leet's statement that "most of the people in the panel wouldn't even know the names of two or three real seismologists," pointing out that there were five seismologists on the Panel. He deprecated Leet's concern for the omission of the Jesuits, pointing out that the Jesuits didn't seem concerned about it. He argued that it was the Russians, not the Americans, who had insisted that the "first [earth] motion" criterion was a good one. 
1966]
ference of Experts had been quite optimistic about the first motion criterion.m And Professor Hans Bethe, a member of the Berkner Panel, had said in 1960, "The best distinguishing mark that seismologists have been able to find is the direction of the so-called first motion-whether the first wiggle starts up or down." 24 The Berkner Panel's lack of personnel who could have made expert judgments on first motion is particularly striking because the Panel's predecessor, the Bethe Panel, had had the same defect, and (unbeknownst to Leet) had been criticized for it.
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There is a possibility, also, that Leet's criticism of Press, Ewing, et al., had some degree of validity. It is hard to believe that they lack the qualifications to be called "real seismologists," but perhaps their personal experience with records was less than optimal. According to Leet, "They haven't looked at enough records. They're big shots; they have other people look at records, and they run organizations that are equipped and manned with people able to read records."
Something is also to be said for Leet's insistence that the Jesuits and/or the Coast and Geodetic Survey should have been represented on the Panel, rather than simply Vela contractors. The roles played by those carrying out a research contract are different from those played by the people who draw up the directions for research.
Finally, it is remarkable that the nation's greatest authority on seismic waves from large explosions, the man who was in charge of seismology at Harvard, the man who was called to measure the seismic waves of the Alamagordo test, the only seismologist called by the Joint Committee before the underground GNOME explosion of 1961 to testify on the possible damage that that explosion might cause, was not consulted before either the organization of the Berkner Panel or the Vela Project, and was rebuffed when he applied to join the program.
23.
The majority of earthquakes can be distinguished from explosions with a high degree of reliability if the direction of first motion of the longitudinal wave is clearly recorded at 5 or more seismic stations on various hearings from the epicenter. Thus not less than 90% of all earthquakes taking place in continents can be identified. The remaining 10% or less of cases will require the analysis of additional seismograms where this is possible; and for this purpose use must also be made of the data of the existing network of seismic stations. If required, these supplementary stations should be further equipped with improved apparatus. 
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TEST BAN
Meanwhile, Leet was no longer very concerned with the past. Sinc early 1962, he had been working on his own, restudying earthquak, records and comparing them to the six (pre-1959) underground ex. plosions whose traces were generally available and not classified. By May, he thought that he had found an answer-a criterion which could discriminate between bombs and earthquakes. It was valid for all of the bomb tests he had looked at; he wanted it to be applied to the records of the more recent tests which were classified and unavailable to persons not working on the Vela project. Leet proposed the following test: when an event has occurred, first examine the records from stations nearest to the epicenter, the point on the earth's surface nearest the event. Measure the ratio of the total energy in the P-waves (the first type received) to the total energy in the S-waves (the next type) on records taken at progressively greater distances from the epicenter. In earthquakes, P dies out first, and the ratio of S over P increases with distance. Then S dies out, and at great distances, only the L waves (the last type received at any given station) remain. They are very small at those great distances, but they are clearly L waves. With explosions, however, L dies out first, then S, and finally P. The distinguishing marks of bomb tests are an S over P ratio which decreases with distance, and a "lonesome P wave" at stations far from the epicenter. The "lonesome P wave" may be too small to be noticed if it were not looked for, but the inspectors would be tipped off to look for it by the decreasing S to P ratio in the records from closer stations.
Whether or not records were ever examined for lonesome P is impossible to know. Leet was still not consulted, and records were not sent to him for his evaluation. To Washington, Leet still represented the irresponsible critic. The Disarmament Agency reproduced and distributed the article that Isvestia had printed about Leet, as an ex-26. Cf. The New York Times April 26, 1962: "University of California seismologists, acting on orders of the Government, refused to say whether their instruments detected today's Pacific nuclear test. 'There is a restriction on any information on seismographic readings during these tests,' a spokesman said. 'The request was made by the Government.' It was speculated that the order stemmed from the 'Vela' project for detecting nuclear explosions with-among other means--seismographs, the instruments used to record earthquakes. It is known that the University of California is engaged in seismological work for the Government."
27. Finally a refutation of Leet's theory came forth, in the form of an article by Carl Romney (the Defense Department representative on the Berkner Panel) in the August 1, 1962 issue of Vesiac, the Vela Project's official digest. 2 9 Leet was not invited to submit a rebuttal, nor was he informed of the impending publication of the article. He was not sent a copy, nor was he informed when it had been published. (He was sent a copy by an old friend. He had been receiving the bulletin regularly since he had submitted a Vela proposal, but the issues stopped coming at about the time he attacked the Berkner Panel.) The bulletin was marked "For official use only." Rightly or wrongly, Leet did not seek to rebut the article; he felt that if he did, he would be criticized and perhaps punished for possessing a document which he was not supposed to have.
The refutation by Romney was riddled with errors and misrepresentations of Leet's theory. For example, it reproduced seismic records of a few underground explosions and instructed, "Note that the largest S waves are many times larger than the P waves." Leet was not talking about the records from one station; he was talking about the trend in the S to P ratio with regard to several stations at varying distances. Furthermore, Leet was not talking about the largest waves; he was talking about the total energy-the summation of all the waves, large and small. In Romney's own graphs, the total energy in the P waves exceeded that energy in the S waves.
On [Vol. 75:1340 pare at once a set of records for Leet to look at. But Leet never received any records.
The story of L. Don Leet is not so much a case of who was right and who was wrong as it is a case of the plight of a man unused to the ways of governmental bureaucracy, who nevertheless may have had something to contribute to a problem in which that bureaucracy, at least at its highest levels, was keenly interested. Had Leet been adept at dealing with governmental or other "inner circles," he could certainly have been successful in representing his theories and perhaps even his criticisms in a more respectable light. He might have renewed contacts with his colleagues and sought their help in getting a Vela contract, or worked through a professional association. He might have been more understanding of the ill-oiled wheels of the Vela bureaucracy, and more resourceful in coping with them; he did not, for instance, take any action between January and December of 1960 to find out what had become of his proposal. And he might have refrained altogether from making what were interpreted as personal attacks on the members of the Berkner Panel. Even if his assertions were correct, they could not possibly advance the cause of his techmical ideas and could only give him a professional black eye.
But the story of Leet is also not a story of mere personal ineptitude. Disarmament research is research by contract, and as innumerable defense contract scandals have shown, research by contract may always degenerate into close or interlocking connections between grantors and grantees unless extreme precautions are taken to insure that all applicants are given an equal chance to participate. The rejection letters which Leet's proposal received suggest one aspect in which the procedure could be improved; the agency should be made to give reasons for rejection or for a choice of one proposal over a similar one from another applicant. Beyond that, the agencies concerned should be aware of the problem, and should make every conceivable effort to consider the merits of proposals even from 'lone wolf' scientists who are not in the club, who have been engaging in some 'unfashionable' line of research, or who have not previously shown an interest in government programs. Disarmament is too important a business for us to be able to afford to lose the services of another L. Don Leet, whose technical theories have to this day been neither proved nor disproved.
THE CAsE OF DR. SP.ETH
Unlike Professor Leet, Dr. Sheridan Dauster Speeth did not approach the problems of the test ban as a political agnostic. Ever since his col-lege days, he had identified himself with liberal causes. Although never a Communist or a Communist sympathizer, he was undoubtedly more radical than the consensus of American opinion. He had joined a sprinkling of liberal mass organizations such as the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, and had done four things which security officers of the Defense Department may have particularly frowned upon: he had been arrested, though neither booked, jailed nor convicted, in a protest against a "take-cover" air raid drill in New York City; he had contributed money to the Committee for Non-Violent Action, whose members engaged in attempting to swim onto Polaris submarines when they were launched; he had gone to Cuba after the revolution in 1960, and after his return, he had joined a chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and served on its executive committee (though he resigned from both in 1961, about the time that the organization fell under Communist control); and he had once audited a course in Marxism given by the Communist historian, Dr. Herbert Aptheker. He was not enrolled in the course, and the school at which it was given was not at that time on the Attorney General's List, though it was later put on the List.
Speeth obtained his M.A. at Harvard and his Ph.D. at Columbia, in the field of psycho-acoustics, with additional study in physics, mathematics, and electronics. He is a member of the Audio Engineering Society, the Acoustical Society of America, the American Geophysical Union, and the Seismological Society of America. The last two were joined after intense study of seismology in his free time. He is also a member of Sigma Xi (the scientific honor society), and SSRS (the organization of scientists who pledge themselves not to contribute to weapons production).
In 1959, Speeth began to think that in his capacity as a member of various liberal and radical organizations, he was having absolutely no effect on the problem of terminating the cold war. He reasoned that the test-ban was a technical problem, however, and that perhaps in his role as a scientist, he could make some contribution to the problem. He was working in a division of Bell Telephone Laboratories which allowed its scientists to work on any project they wished, and he turned his attention to the problem of discriminating bomb seismograms from those of earthquakes. During 1960 he applied himself to a study of seismology, and in the summer of that year he combined what he learned with his training in psycho-acoustics.
The human ear is a very sensitive instrument, and the human nervous system is an excellent machine for the discrimination of sounds. [Vol. 75:1340 Speeth sent the waves from bombs and earthquakes into an IBM computer, programmed so as to perform certain operations on the waves and then increase their frequency by four hundred times, thus bringing the waves into the range of human hearing. Tape recordings of the time-compressed waves could then be played to human subjects. Speeth found that after a few training sessions, in which the subjects were positively reinforced each time they made a correct discrimination, "listeners were successful in separating one class of events from the other in over 90% of the cases presented to them." 30 Mere visual inspection of the seismograms could show no identifying characteristics; only the ear could tell the difference.
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Speeth used bomb records of the 1958 HARDTACK series, but these had a very serious drawback. The Air Force had used portable seismometers, and had picked them up immediately after the bomb tests. They had not left them in place long enough to record any West Coast earthquakes. Nor had the Air Force ever taken seismometers back to record such earthquakes. Thus although Speeth used bombs and earthquakes recorded over the same distances and of comparable magnitudes, he did not have "matched pairs" which were recorded over precisely the same path of travel through the ground.
Nevertheless, Speeth was quite excited about his results. He wrote up his report, and immediately applied to Bell for a release for publication. A new set of negotiations were about to begin in Geneva; he wanted very much to discuss his results with Hans Bethe, who was to be a participant. Just before the negotiations were to begin, Speeth asked his department head for permission to discuss the work with Bethe that weekend. Speeth was told that he could not do that, for, even though he had not used classified information, his paper had been classified, and he would have to obtain a release. "How long will that take?" he asked. "Just apply for it," he was told. He did.
Time passed. Eventually, Speeth was called into the office of Bell's Vice President, John Tukey (a member of the Berkner Panel), who suggested to Speeth that he rewrite his article, replacing the word "bomb" wherever it occurred with the word "explosion," and omitting an entire section entitled "Suggestion for a detection system" which discussed the implications of the research for a test-ban monitoring system. Tukey revealed that Carl Romney (the Air Force's seismologist on the Berkner Panel) had been called in to review the paper, though Speeth was not told if it was Romney who insisted on the alterations.
Speeth rewrote the paper, and it was again returned to him. He re- wrote it once more, and once more it was rejected. Meanwhile, he had given his secretary a copy of one of the rewrites, and had instructed her to make several photocopies and to draw up covering letters to the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, and to various liberal scientists around the country, such as Linus Pauling and Harrison Brown. Thus the moment that clearance came through, the report could be dropped into the mail and circulated. According to Speeth, his secretary received a release from the patents division of Bell in late December, 1960, and, mistaking it for a release for publication, she mailed out several copies of the paper, including a copy to the Journal. The officials at Bell soon discovered what had happened. Speeth was told not to send out any more copies. His superior called the Journal and requested the editor to return the article. Speeth was told that the article was "politically loaded," and that he would have to be more careful.
Speeth rewrote the article a third time. Still publication was denied. On January 15, 1961, Speeth sent to his superior an angry letter of resignation. He stated After more carefully reading the changes suggested for my paper I have made the following decisions: I do not want to rewrite Seismometer Sounds. Nor since it has finally reached a few responsible scientists, do I even insist that it be further distributed in its present form.
Three days later, the reply read, "Come by and see me; Max and I have a version you will want to see." Speeth and his superior now negotiated a new version, which was promptly cleared for publication and resubmitted to the Journal. The Journal's editor was so excited about it that he gave it a publication priority, and it appeared as quickly as the Journal's printing lag would allow (i.e., the July issue).
Meanwhile, Charles Bates, chief of Vela Uniform, wrote to Speeth on March 17 and asked him for six copies of his report. This was not surprising, since some of the pre-publication copies had gone to Vela contractors (e.g., Frank Press).
On July 25, 1961, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy began its hearings on Project Vela. That same morning, the Washington Post had carried an Associated Press story which summarized the Journal article, and discussed its implications for a testban. 31 During the hearings, Representative Melvin Price of Illinois asked Richard Latter to discuss Speeth's results. Latter was a theoretical 31. Speeth had not issued a press release or otherwise sought additional publicity.
[Vol. 75:1340 physicist with no experience in psycho-acoustics. He had visited Bell Laboratories the previous year, but he had not talked to Speeth (the only man at Bell working on this project). His testimony was non-commital, but he indicated that the research should be pursued. 32 Not satisfied with Latter's answer, Price asked the same question of Dr. Bates of ARPA. Bates also suggested that the method was worth looking into. He commented that in the Navy, "you still use the human ear generally in sonar for distinguishing between whether you have a submarine or a whale." And he revealed that a similar program was being conducted at the University of Michigan; their work had gone on only two months, but they had been able to discriminate by ear between a 6-ton chemical explosion and a comparable earthquake.3
Shortly after the hearings, Speeth was told that Bell had been awarded an unsolicited Vela contract to cover his work; the contract would apply retroactively to the summer of 1960.M 4 Meanwhile, Speeth had begun working on a device that would replace the human ear, a formula by which a computer could discriminate between bombs and quakes by applying the same criteria which the ear applied. But he was at a great disadvantage, because he lacked seismic records which dearly recorded the earth motion. He had access to Coast and Geodetic recordings, but the method by which those recordings were made yielded only clear pictures of the time at which different portions of the waves began; they did not show the waveform very well. 3 5 The Department of Defense had better records, and a military officer who visited Bell in the fall of 1961 promised Speeth that they would be sent to him.
While waiting for the improved records (which he hoped would include records of the underground test series which began in 1961), Speeth continued to work on the automatic ear, doing as best he could 52. Some time ago I visited the Bell Telephone Laboratory to hear about their work of listening ... [to bombs and quakes] . At that time the work was in a very preliminary state, and I think that I would not have concluded that there was any real scientific basis for believing that discrimination of earthquakes from explosions by this means was possible. I think though that it is a method which must be looked at. If we are to have any chance of a breakthrough, we have to take advantage of every possible opportunity in our research program. Atomic Energy, 24-25 (1961 with the records at hand. One day in the spring of 1962, he was called into the office of his superior and told that he would not be able to get even the lowest grade of security clearance, and therefore he would not be able to see the improved recordings. He was also told that since he could not see the recordings, he would not be able to make much of a contribution, and therefore he was being taken off of the Vela Uniform project. Speeth had once before requested Bell to put in an application for "confidential" clearance for him, but he had been told that it was so certain that he could not get it, that it would be a waste of money to conduct a security review. Speeth went to work on an innocuous project, but he continued to work on detection in his spare time. During 1962, he accomplished two objectives, he re-did his experiment, using matched pairs of bombs from the 1958 series and quakes, and concluded that every subject could learn to make the discrimination, and that some could obtain a score of up to 74%. He also developed a formula for making the discrimination without using the human ear. 36 Meanwhile, Speeth had been requested by the International Journal of Science and Technology to write a note for them bringing his work up to date, i.e., reporting progress since the Journal article. Speeth wrote such a note; it was a general summary, containing no quantitative results. In all, it was five paragraphs in length. On November 2, 1962, Speeth submitted it to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for clearance.
Hearings on Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear Explosions and Relationship to Test Ban Negotiations Before the joint Committee on
Speeth's note was shuttled from office to office within the Pentagon. At one point it was "lost" and Speeth had to resubmit it.37 Despite the brevity of the article, clearance was not granted by the Directorate of Security Review until five and a half months had elapsed. The only major change made was the deletion of three sentences (one of which read, "Recordings from a 'Geneva-type' station should soon be available.. ."). Due to the publication delays of the Journal, the note could not be published until August, nine months after the paper had been -ritten. 38 A more comprehensive review of Speeth's research was submitted as a report to ARPA. In this paper Speeth discussed his results quantitatively, described the discrimination formula which had made suc- [Vol. 75:1340 cessful discriminations in every case he had available, and analyzed why the formula should be correct in every case, though humans would have a certain percentage of errors. He also suggested that some of the human errors were due to the poor quality of the records. 30 On the weekend of March 2, 1963, just before the 1963 Joint Commitee hearings opened, Speeth was requested by the Department of Defense to fly to Washington and brief ARPA officials on his work (despite the fact that he was not then an official ARPA investigator). Speeth did fly down, and he spent an afternoon explaining his work to a small group of uniformed officers.
Three days later, Representative Price asked Dr. Ruina of ARPA to bring the Committee up-to-date on Speeth's work. Ruina testified:
We have done more work in the field. It still doesn't look like it would be a very promising technique in itself .... I believe that Dr. Speeth may have reported results as high as 85 to 90% of the records were correctly identified by a trained observer. When the experiments were done under slightly more careful conditions, the result was between 60 and 70% identification . . . . A 60%o number is hardly an impressive number. However there seems to be enough to this that we are not quite ready to drop the work and we want to explore it as far as we can .... It is not the sort of thing that is capable of very extensive work. There are a few researchers working at the University of Michigan and a few working at the Bell Telephone Laboratories independently. They are now going to get a lot more data to work with, a lot more records, and try to handle the records in an identical way so there is no built-in bias in the experiment and then try it again. 40 Later in the hearing, Dr. John DeNoyer of the Institute for Defense Analysis said
The most recent work by this method indicates that events can be identified correctly about 647 of the time. This is better than half correct answers and as such it should be encouraging .... This method does contain a hidden danger. Seismograms from explosion sources were called earthquakes about as often as seismograms from earthquakes were called explosions. Any diagnostic aid must be viewed with caution that classifies an explosion as an earthquake. We do not have a method of training people in auditory recognition. Possibly with better methods of training the technique might improve, but this is pure speculation. Energy, 82-83 I93) . 41 . Id. at 220-21.
Hearings on Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear Weapons Tests Before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Speeth did not see the testimony until the hearings were published in late May. When he read them, he was shocked and angered by what he believed to be deliberate distortions of his experiment. He deduced that the government scientists had attributed to his experimental design (with filtering, a sophisticated system for training the subjects and a mathematical formula for discrimination) the less impressive results obtained by other experimenters using a different experimental design at Michigan. 42 He also was astonished to read in the testimony that Vela was supporting "a few" researchers at Bell when in fact the only researcher-himself-had been taken off the project. As for the pledge that "they would get a lot more records," he had not received any in the two months since the hearings (and he never did).
Whether or not the case of Dr. Speeth is atypical of the Vela research program, it raises serious questions. Speeth was not merely a scientist working on test detection; he was a researcher who had actually made a discovery-in his eyes, a discovery with important implications for the U. S. detection effort. Yet he was not encouraged by his superiors, nor given much attention by the superiors of his superiors, nor taken seriously by the men at the very top of Vela Uniform. At every stage, his work was treated not as an exciting discovery which should be widely publicized, even if imperfect, so that it could be improved upon by the scientists of all nations; rather it was treated either as political dynamite to be heavily shielded or as rather routine research to be perfected and then sent to the proper authorities with the appropriate serial number and classification. True, scientists at Michigan were encouraged to work along the lines which he had pioneered. That development, however, by no means compensated for the removal of Speeth from the Vela project. other than Speeth the project lost whatever product results from the enthusiasm, indeed, the fanatic effort, of a scientist who really believes in his work. Why should data pertinent to disarmament be classified? Even if Speeth were a security risk, why should he not have received the seismic records he sought? Assuming that the United States' position-that it is willing to lower its political demands to conform with technological advances in detection-is an honest one, there seems to be no valid reason to prevent even the Russians or the Chinese from receiving whatever detection data the United States has available.
Most likely, classification in disarmament has resulted from the fact that the research program has been placed in the Defense Department, and natural organizational tendencies in that Department lead to excessive security. 4 4 Possibly the taboos of security result also from well-intentioned political motivations-the Administration may fear that the Senate would not ratify a treaty which is to be policed in part by a discovery of a man who had been an officer of a Fair Play for Cuba Committee. It seems entirely possible that Frantti was put to work re-doing the experiment, and Speeth taken off his project, so that if anything did develop from the auditory discrimination method, it could be billed as a discovery by Frantti.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the price paid is much too high. I know of several persons who have gone to work for agencies of the government concerned with disarmament not because they are indifferently seeking employment, but because they wished to make a real contribution towards ending the nuclear arms race. It is not unlikely that persons of this sort will have actively engaged in liberal political causes, or been members of organizations seeking greater accommodation with the Soviet Union and China. Many of them can nevertheless be of substantial value in their technical capacities. Barring a bona fide government need for restriction of information, it is unwise to prevent any scientist (or economist or sociologist) from working in this field because of his past political background. As Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have recognized, arms control and disarmament deserve top priorities. From the history of American policy formation during the test ban negotiations, politicians can learn to use more effectively the scientific resources at hand.
44. "Everyone dealing with security affairs has an overwhelming motive to play it safe, to run no personal risks, and to give each item a high enough security dassifiition so that he can never be criticized by his political superiors." Do%' K. PRcIC, GoMLNMF-_r, AN Scmrwa 43 (1954) .
